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This thesis explores the effects of suppressive fire
in the dynamics of a fire fight. Lanchester-Type models,
in which attrition is proportional to the number of firers
,
are considered. The classical Lanchester Square-Law has
been modified to reflect the effects of suppressive fire
through changes in the time dependent, attrition rate
coefficients
.
The basic approach is to develop a series of mathe-
matical models by phasing model construction. This tech-
nique begins by examining an initial model and then
progresses by refining the preceding model. In this
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For centuries men have studied all forms of combat in
order to identify and understand the factors which influence
the successful outcome of battle. The importance of this
work is more fully appreciated when one realizes its con-
tribution to National Security. Obviously, it is this
realization that has furnished most of the impetus for the
continuing efforts in this field.
Although great studies have been made and undoubtedly
will continue to be made the nature of the problem precludes
any ultimate solution. As a result., there will always exist
a need for analysis of conflict situations. In recent years
analysts have enhanced the study of these situations by
adopting a quantitative approach.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this study is to incorporate the effects
of suppressive fire in the dynamics of a fire fight. The
basic approach is to develop a series of rather simple
mathematical models which hopefully will provide insight
into the relationship between suppressive fire and the
outcome of a battle. Secondly, it is hoped that the models
will provide valuable information relative to trade-offs
between weapon systems accuracy and rates of fire thus
proving beneficial in the area of weapon systems design.
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In recent years, much work pertaining to the analysis
of conflict situations has been done by using Lanchester's
theory. A good overview of these works can be gained by
consulting [5, 6, 7, and 12]. Also, it has become evident
that much work has been done with respect to the psycho-
logical effects of experiencing fire from various weapon
systems. Even though there has been much interest in the
field of suppressive fire, there is no indication that an
analytic model of this phenomenon exists. Therefore this
study will be directed toward developing a simple analytic
model which will facilitate the exploration of the effects
of suppressive fire.
It should be pointed out that [10] addresses a somewhat
similar problem in attempting re determine the most effec-
tive support weapons mix of an array tested and the most
efficient Weapons Basic Infantry Element size. This study
provides an experimental approach to the effects of sup-
pressive fire. Suppression was operationally defined as
follows: a target was said to be suppressed if two projec-
tiles passed within 2 meters of the target within any .04
minute time interval. The duration of the suppression
lasted for .06 minutes and was extended for .01 minutes for
each projectile that passed within 2 meters of the target
while it was suppressed.
Some of the problems inherent in the study proposed have
been studied by the Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL)
and Psychological Research Association (PRA) . The first of

these, BRL, has done numerous studies on single shot hit
probabilities as well as on kill probabilities [1, 2, 3].
On the other hand, PRA has done numerous studies on the
effects of small arms fire with respect to suppressive fire.
One of these studies in particular [8] addressed the rela-
tionship of volume of fire (automatic versus semi-automatic
fire) with the miss-distance in an attempt to gain insight
into the area of suppressive fire.
Eventhough there have been studies of the types mentioned
above it is thought that an approach using Lanchester's
theory would add a new dimension from which to view the
problem. Modern military doctrine stresses the importance
of achieving fire superiority when engaged in combat yet no
analytical model has taken this into account.
C. MODEL CONSTRUCTION
The basic approach to the construction of models will be
as follows. An analysis of military operations will be
given in order to provide the information needed for genera-
tion of a mathematical model. More specifically, a discus-
sion pertaining to land combat between small units (company
size or smaller) will be given in order to identify the
factors which characterize these engagements. The intent
is to identify these variables and then to hypothesize
relationships between them and finally to examine how these
hypothesized interrelationships influence the interaction of
opposing forces in a fire fight.
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After the general background and the scenario have been
established the approach then turns to one of phasing the
development of the various models. The phased approach has
been chosen in order to facilitate a more controlled study.
It is thought that better perspective pertaining to the
problem can be gained during each phase and thus prove
beneficial in the following phase. The phased approach
begins by examining a rather crude model and then pro-
gresses by refining the preceding model. In this manner
four different models will be discussed.
11

II. ANALYSIS OF A FIRE FIGHT
A. GENERAL
In order to enhance the development of a valid mathe-
matical model of a fire fight, an analysis of an infantry
fire fight will be given below. A fire fight may develop
as the result of various tactical operations but once
initiated the basic characteristics pertaining to the
dynamics of the fire fight are generally the same. In the
development below, neither force is allowed to maneuver
against the other or withdraw from the engagement.
B. THE FIRE FIGHT
Normally the fire fight is initiated by one force firing,
at the other, first. However, circumstances may prevail in
which both forces open fire at the same time. Regardless
of the way the fight is initiated, once it has begun the
immediate reaction of both forces is to seek cover if cover
has not been previously attained. Once the combatants have
taken cover the next reaction is to assume a firing position
and to attempt to locate targets on which to deliver aimed
fire. If no targets can be detected a normal reaction is to
deliver area fire at the assumed location of the opposing
force. Thus the fire fight develops intensity which acts to
restrict the movement of the individual combatants. At this
stage of the fire fight the combatant assesses the danger or
12

threat to himself and reacts accordingly. Since the com-
batant must expose himself to some degree in order to
deliver fire he is more vulnerable than when not firing and
taking cover. There is also a tendency for the combatant
to believe that if he fires his weapon at the enemy that
he will be detected and thus receive a larger volume of
fire. Thus the combatant is faced with the decision to
fire or not to fire and to seek more cover. This dilema
exists in all fire fights and is the condition that enhances
the attainment of suppression. Obviously, if a combatant
decides not to fire, the volume of fire that is being
delivered by his force is reduced. When the fires of a
force are reduced this allows the combatants of the oppos-
ing force to expose themselves more and thus enhances their
ability to destroy the other force.
C. SIGNIFICANT FACTORS
A fire fight is characterized by numerous factors many
of which are difficult to analyze or evaluate. Examples of
these factors are morale, training level, psychological
conditioning, and esprit de corps. This study does not
attempt to incorporate these factors or similar factors.
The dynamics of a fire fight are also characterized by
factors which are more easily assessed. Important factors
of this type which are readily identified are: force
levels, individual rates of fire, single shot kill prob-
abilities, and types of fire (area/aimed). Target
13

acquisition of course plays an important role in a fire
fight; however, an assumption of this study is that targets
are readily detected.
D. INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF FACTORS
Force levels are of considerable importance in the
analysis of a fire fight because this is the most valuable
resource. The volume of fire delivered by a force is
directly dependent on the size of the force and the rates
of fire of the individual combatants. Individual rates of
fires are influenced of course by weapon characteristics
but more critically by the individual combatant as a result
of his decision to fire or not to fire and seek more cover.
Additionally, rates of fire will normally be dependent on
the type of fire being employed. Generally speaking, aimed
fire is characterized by a lower rate of fire than area
fire. Thus the volume of fire delivered by a force is
dependent on force levels, rates of fire, types of fire,
and decisions of individual combatants. Since the indi-
vidual combatant's decision to fire or not to fire is
influenced by the accuracy and volume of fire that he
receives we can thus link the volume of fire that one force
delivers to the accuracy and volume of fire delivered by the
opposing force. This is to say that suppression effects
the volume of fire delivered by a force.
As noted, when the fires of a combatant are suppressed
the opposing force receives a smaller volume of fire unless
of course other combatants increase their rates of fire.
14

When the situation develops to the point that one force is
receiving fire that is less devastating than the fires being
delivered by that force, then the combatants of that force
are more apt to increase their rates of fire. In conjunc-
tion with this development it is possible that the accuracy
of these fires could increase. This would be facilitated by
the adoption of more stable firing positions in light of
the fact that this force is receiving less damaging fires.
Additionally, these combatants would probably increase their
target detection capability by assuming better firing posi-
tions. The adoption of better firing positions by the force
that is apparently winning contains the inherent assumption
that this act necessitates a greater degree of exposure by
the comiDQtianTis •
Single shot kill probabilities are of course directly
related to the type of fire being employed and to weapon
characteristics. This is due to the assumption that aimed
fire is characterized by a higher hit probability than area
fire. Additionally since this study is concerned with only
non-fragmenting projectiles, a hit is necessary for a kill.
Having thus identified essential factors for analysis




III. A COMPARISON OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
A. GENERAL
There are numerous types of small unit military opera-
tions which are currently being employed in Vietnam.
Needless to say, all of these operations differ in some
respects and are similar in others.
The following discussion of military operations is
given in order to provide the reader with some background
material and additionally to stimulate ideas which may prove
helpful in model construction. The opinions expressed are
those held by the author whose experience comes from eight
years service with the Infantry. Perhaps it should also
be noted that the author has commanded both an Infantry
Company and a Mechanized Infantry Company in combat.
Generally speaking, all small unit combat engagements
result from either an attack, ambush, or meeting engagement.
A meeting engagement [11] is that combat action which occurs
when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle,
engages an enemy force concerning which it has inadequate
intelligence. The enemy force may either be static or
moving. For purposes of discussion I will differentiate
between the ambush and the meeting engagement. The ambush
will be viewed as an engagement in which the ambushee has
no information pertaining to the ambusher.
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The most striking difference among these three types of
engagements is the amount of intelligence or information
that the combatants possess. In the case of the attack, the
attacker generally has extensive information pertaining to
the location and disposition of the defending force. As
mentioned above, in the ambush the ambushee has no informa-
tion relative to the ambusher. Finally for the meeting
engagement neither side has adequate intelligence pertaining
to the other.
Another striking difference which exists among these
actions pertains to cover. In the attack, the attacker will
generally have less cover than the defender who more often
than not will occupy well prepared defensive positions. If
an ambush is planned well, the ambushee will be afforded no
cover while the ambusher will enjoy varying degrees of
cover. For the meeting engagement normally both forces will
have the same degree of cover available.
Force sizes also provide a point of difference among
these operations. For the attack, the attackers will usually
out number the defender by at least two to one. Generally
speaking, the ambusher prefers to ambush a force no larger
than his own. However, if good preparations have been made
for the ambush the ambusher may choose to engage a force
much larger than his own. The meeting engagement is not
restricted with respect to force size, any size unit may
meet any size unit.
17

Types of fire (aimed/area) and rates of fire also vary
among these different engagements. In the attack shots are
either aimed or well-directed. The volume or rate of fire
is usually high initially and as the attackers close with
the defenders the rate of fire is reduced to allow well-
aimed shots. Current procedures require the ambushee to
fire intensively at the area in which he suspects the
ambusher to be located and to simultaneously move toward
the ambusher in an effort to extricate himself from the kill
zone. The meeting engagement is normally characterized by
aimed fire of moderate intensity.
Target acquisition is generally different for each of
these engagements. In the case of the ambush, the ambushee
has little chance of detecting the ambusher, and thus he
employs area fire. The attacker, on the other hand,
initially may not detect well defined targets but as he
approaches the objective target detection becomes easier.
Normally the meeting engagement is such that the two forces
confronting each other have little trouble detecting the
other.
Although the ranges at which these engagements take
place vary, usually the ranges are restricted to the extent
that each side can effectively employ his weapons against
the other. Another similar characteristic among these
operations is the mission of the combatant. In each case a
primary role of the combatant is to place effective fire
on the enemy. The combatant, because of human nature, also
18

possesses a will to survive in all of these engagements.
This fact enhances the attainment of neutralizing fire which
is defined in [4] as fire which is delivered to hamper and
interrupt movement/ and/or the firing of weapons. This type
of fire is commonly referred to as suppressive fire. In all
of these engagements, the combatants level of training will
greatly influence his actions when he is receiving fire and
thus contribute to his effectiveness when he is the object
of suppressive fire.
Current military doctrine stresses the importance of
obtaining fire superiority prior to maneuvering against an
enemy force. If this cannot be done, the use of fire and
movement (as related to the ambushee above) is encouraged,
i-'ire superiority is defined in [II] as that degree of fire
that allows the attacker to advance against the enemy posi-
tion without numerous losses. If a force has fire super-
iority, it will also normally be producing effective
suppressive fire.
B. RELATIONSHIP OF VARIABLES
Obviously, the amount of relative information known by
the two sides involved in any engagement is going to effect
the attrition rates of each force. Similarly, the force
ratio and amount of cover available are going to effect the
attrition rates. Closely related to each other, we have
the factors of target detection, type of fire and rate of
fire. If targets are easily detected, fire will normally
19

be aimed and of moderate intensity. If, on the other hand,
target detection is difficult the fire will consist of area
fire and probably a large volume of fire. Training levels
of combatants will contribute directly to the units effec-
tiveness through such factors as marksmanship, immediate
action drills, reaction under fire, and many other factors
whose contributions are not as well recognized.
As of yet, the duration of each of these engagements
has been omitted. In a study of this nature it would seem
feasible to establish plausible time intervals for each of
them. In the case of an ambush the actual ambushing will
last for only several minutes at most. This is due to two
factors. If the ambush is well planned the ambushee will
be quickly annihilated regardless of his efforts to avoid
destruction. If the ambush is not well planned the ambushee
can succeed in removing himself from the kill zone and
thereby carry the attack to the ambusher.
For a planned attack, the duration will depend on
several factors such as force ratios, relative cover, size
of the objective, and the distance that the attacking force
must travel. Of course there are many other factors which
contribute to the duration of an attack but it is not
necessary to list them in order to see that the duration of
an attack is highly variable.
Normally, the time span over which a meeting engagement
takes place is of moderate length. It can be thought of as
lasting longer than an ambush but less than a planned
20

attack. A reason for this is that both forces are free to
disengage if they choose to do so.
In a study of this type it is essential to consider
realistic times because often the time element alone will
change the outcome of an engagement through the attrition
coefficients and initial force levels. Consider also the
impact that the duration of an engagement has on rates of
fire. If an engagement is going to be prolonged and if no
resupply of ammunition is available the combatant is going
to tend to make every shot count and in so doing fire only
well-aimed shots at clearly defined targets.
The above discussion thus provides a basis from which




Since the purpose of this study is to examine the
effects of suppressive fire on the dynamics of an infantry
fire fight it is desirable to use a scenario that is both
realistic and simple to model. For these reasons the
scenario will describe a meeting engagement. The situation
may develop as follows. Opposing forces are moving through
an area when suddenly contact is made. Both forces sub-
sequently deploy and engage in a fire fight .
Since there is no desire to prejudice the outcome we
assume that the cover and concealment afforded the forces is
On the cxveraye the same lor each. In order to facilitate
target detection we also assume that the position of each
combatant on the opposing side is known by all members of
the remaining side. Further we assume that aimed fire is
employed by both forces and that each combatant can observe
the effectiveness of his fire. Since each combatant will
know when his fires have caused those of his opponent to
cease we require him to shift his fires to another combatant
Throughout the engagement we require that all fires be dis-
tributed uniformly over all active targets. An active
target is to denote a combatant in a firing position who is
returning fire.
For simplicity we will assume that combatants on the
same side are armed with the same type weapon. There is no
22

requirement for the opposing forces to be similarly armed.
Further, we require that the weapons fire single non-
fragmenting projectiles. The use of supporting weapons is
not allowed within this framework. The only exchange of
fire will be characterized by semi-automatic fire.
To preclude the problem of modeling movement of forces
we require that the forces do not maneuver or disengage.
It is assumed that each combatant is in a prone firing
position and that each combatant represents a circular
target. Further, it is assumed that all combatants of one





Based on the assumptions and situation presented in the
scenario, the square-law attrition process has been postu-
lated to apply to both sides. A square-law attrition
process is one which depicts the casualties of a force as
being proportional to the number of combatants of the
opposing force.
In this model the attrition rate coefficients are depen-
dent on the firing rates and the single shot kill probabil-
ities of the respective forces, i.e..
Attrition Rate Firing Rate Single Shot
Per Unit of = Per Unit of X Kill Probability
Weapon System Weapon System Per Round
This model will incorporate the effect of suppression
through a function which is designed to alter the firing
rates of the two forces. To preclude unrealistic rates of
fire, the firing rates of the forces are bounded above and
below. The function, referenced above, is structured to
increase the rate of fire of the force that is delivering
the greater volume of fire and simultaneously decrease the
rate of fire of the force that is delivering the smaller
volume of fire. The amount of increase or decrease of the
respective rates of fire is governed by parameters of the
model which reflect plausible increments of change. If the
24

volumes of fire are equal, no change is made in the firing
rate of either force.
The single shot kill probabilities, of the respective
forces , are assumed to remain constant throughout the dura-
tion of the battle. As previously noted, a kill is not
possible without a hit since the model only considers non-
fragmenting projectiles. Finally, it should be noted that
the probabilities are single shot probabilities and there-
fore the model is restricted to considering only semi-
automatic fire.
B. BASIC EQUATIONS
The Lanchester-type equations for a square-law attrition
process with time dependent attrition rates are given by
dX/dt = - a(t)Y (5)
and
dY/dt = - 3 (t)X (6)
where
-ttt is the rate of attrition for the X force and -r— isdt dt
the rate of attrition for the Y forces. a (t) is the rate
at which the Y force kills members of the X force and is
given by
a(t) = v (t)Pj£
where v (t) is the rate of fire being employed by each of
the Y combatants at time t and P^ is the single shot kill
probability for the Y force (i.e., the probability of
killing an X combatant with a single shot). Similarly,
25





where v (t) and P, are defined analogously to the terms
above.











/dt = C Sgn[v (t)Y(t) - V
x
(t)X(t)] (8)
where C and C are positive parameters reflecting the
incremental change in the volumes of fire for the X and





-1 for y <
for y =
+ 1 for y >
finally,
m < v (t) < M
X — X — X
and
m < v (t) < M
y - y - y
where m is a preassigned minimum rate of fire for the X
force and M is a preassigned maximum rate of fire for the
X force. The terms for the Y force are similarly defined.
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C. FINITE DIFFERENCE APPROXIMATION
It has not been possible to develop an analytic solution
to the system of equations (5)-(8). Consequently, finite
difference methods have been employed to generate an
approximate numerical solution. Finite difference methods
replace differential equations for an unknown function by
algebraic equations. One approach is to replace differen-
tials by corresponding difference quotients. The simplest
such approximation leads to the Euler integration method.
Consider the function Y = F(X). The derivative is defined
as
lim F(X+AX) - F(X)
_
lim AY
Ax+0 (X+AX)- (X) Ax + AX
Now, instead of following this limiting approach, X is
considered to be a finite quantity and the limit is not
taken. Thus we may write
Ay (X) = y (X+AX) - y (X)
where AY(X) gives the difference between the function at
two points X and X+AX. Since we are concerned with a finite
difference interval AX, the distance between any two succes-
sive points in the domain of the function is finite. If
we require the difference interval AX to be a constant also,
then we may express any point in the domain of the function
as a multiple of AX. Consider the closed line segment
[0, T] which has length T. This line segment can be thought
of as consisting of N intervals of length At such that
N«At = T or At = T/N. If we have one point of the domain,
27

say x, then by a proper choice of scale we could write the
successive points of such a domain as x, t+1, t+2 , and
so on.
The order of a difference equation is given as the
maximum difference of the difference intervals in the
equation. From above we have
Y(X+1) - Y(X) = AY(X)
by letting AX = 1. This equation is then a first order
difference equation since X + 1 - X = 1. This equation may
be written as
Y(X+1) = Y(X) + AY(X) .
A more general equation is given by
Y(X+N) = Y(X+N-1) + AY(X+N-1)
for N = 0,1/2/... . Thus by use of this recursive rela-
tionship we can obtain approximations for : equations (5) -(8)
Using a change in notation, the approximations are
X„
+1 = XN - (At)vjp^ (9)





+ V^I^kr-^V 4* 1 (11)
ii-^V5"*-^ 111' 1 <12)
where (At) is a properly chosen difference interval and
m < v* < M and m < V„ < M .
x — N — x y — N — y
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For these approximations to be acceptable, the difference
interval or time step (At) had to be selected so that the
truncation error was not too large. The selection of an
appropriate time step and the accuracy of the computer
algorithm used to compute values for equations (9)
-(12) was
checked by considering a special case for which equations
(5)
-(8) possess a simple analytic solution. Such a case is
when a(t) and 3 (t) are constants. In this special case the
numerical solution could be compared with the well-known
time solution for force levels for a square-law attrition
process
.
D. DISCUSSION OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
A Fortran IV (G) Program was written to produce data
for analysis. Using this routine several sets of parameters
were used to provide a variety of data. Graphs of the
results appear in Figures 1-7.
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows the result that
the rate of fire increment has on the outcome of a battle.
In this case the rate of fire increment was changed from
.25 rounds per man per minute to .99 rounds per man per
minute for the X force. As a result the battle depicted
in Figure 2 was 10 minutes shorter than the battle depicted
in Figure 1. Additionally, the X force sustained 1.15
fewer casualties. An interesting side note stems from the
fact that the amount of ammunition required was signifi-
cantly less in Figure 2.
29

In order to show the effect of a change in kill
probability, Figures 3 and 4 were constructed. As a result
of increasing the kill probability for the Y force from
.005 to .00 8 the battle time was reduced to 16.9 minutes
from 32.2 minutes. Perhaps a more significant result is
that the Y force casualties were reduced by slightly over
2 men. Again in this instance considerably less ammuni-
tion is used by the Y force.
The effect of initial force levels is compared in
Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 depicts an X force of 12 men
against a Y force of 8 men. In this battle Y is victorious
and has on the average approximately 3 survivors. In
Figure 6 the X force consists of 10 men and the Y force
remains 8 men. In this battle the X force is annihilated
at the cost of only approximately 2.5 casualties to the Y
force. Clearly, this reduction of two men from the X force
has a gigantic effect on the battle outcome. It should be
pointed out that this result was caused directly by the
model. Analysis of the parameters used will show that in
Figure 6 both forces had the same initial volume of fire.
Since the Y force had a greater kill probability it subse-
quently developed a greater volume of fire and this resulted
in the defeat of the X force.
Figure 7 is used to show the effect of rate of fire.
In this example both forces are the same size and both
forces have the same kill probabilities. The X force fires
one less round per man per minute than does the Y force.
30

The end result is the quick annihilation of the X force.
This too, is caused directly by the structure of the model.
E . COMMENTS
As a result of the preceding analysis it is obvious that
this model does reflect the effects of parameter manipula-
tion and as a result provides insight pertaining to desir-
able force characteristics. However, the model is deficient
in realistically assessing the value of a given volume of
fire. For this reason the X force in Figure 7 is quickly
annihilated. In order to better assess the effects of
suppressive fire a better analysis and comparison of the
respective volumes of fire is needed. This problem will





The basic assumption underlying Model I is that the
force which has a greater volume of fire should be rewarded
and the force with the smaller volume of fire should be
penalized. This assumption is an attempt to incorporate
the effect of suppressive fires into the outcome of the
battle. While this idea may initially seem appealing, it
possesses a pitfall which must be overcome. For example,
the model rules in favor of the force which has the greater
volume of fire without giving any consideration to the
relative sizes of these volumes. Thus if the volumes of
fire differ by any amount the force that has the greater
volume will be allowed to increase its rate of fire by a
preassigned amount while the force that has the smaller
volume of fire must decrease its rate of fire by a constant
amount.
Thus a modification will be made on Model I which will
cause the changes in rates of fire to be more responsive to
the difference between the volumes of fire. Actually,
Model II will be structured so that the changes in rates
of fire will be directly proportional to the difference
between the volumes of fire. The portion of the model that
is designed to reflect force levels over time will be
32

modified only by incorporation of values of v (t) and v (t)
which have been computed as discussed above.
B. MODEL DESCRIPTION
As mentioned above, equations (5) and (6) still apply
to Model II. It should be noted that now the attrition rate
coefficients a(t) and 3 (t) reflect the modification of
Model I so that




where v (t) and v* (t) indicate the rates of fire for
x y
Model II. These rates stem from the equations
dv /dt = C [v (t)X(t) - v (t)Y(t)] (13)
dv /dt = C [v (t)Y(t) - v (t)X(t)] (14)
y y y x






+ CxI VN • XN "
V
N • V [Atl (15)
V
N+1= VN +CV [VN • YN" VN • XN ][Atl (16)
As in Model I, we require that
and
m < v„ < M
x — N — x
m < v^ < M
y - N - y
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C. DISCUSSION OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
The same sets of parameters that were used for Model I
were also used for Model II. Thus a comparison of the
results is possible. The graphs of this data appear in
Figures 8-14.
A comparison of Figures 1 and 8 reveals that for
Model II the duration of the battle was reduced by approxi-
mately 16 minutes. Again the X force was victorious but as
a result of the shorter battle the X force would on the
average suffer approximately 2 less casualties. Figure 9
reveals a situation that is nearly identical to that of
Figure 8 eventhough the rate of fire increment for the X
force for Figure 9 was nearly 4 times that used in Figure 8,
This result is due Lo the facL Lhat the X force quickly
reaches its maximum rate of fire. The curves of Figures 3
and 4 differ only slightly from those of Figures 10 and 11.
The most noticeable difference is that of battle duration
which is, of course, due to the rapid changes in rates of
fire.
Figures 5 and 12 reveal identical results eventhough
two different models were used. The results are justified
because the rates of fire did not change from the initial
rates of fire. This result thus lends credibility to the
computation procedure. Analysis of Figures 6 and 7 reveals






The intent of Model II was to incorporate a mechanism
that would consider the difference between the volumes of
fire of the two forces and effect changes in the rates of
fire which were proportional to the difference. This basic
idea is appealing; however, there still exists a pitfall in
this approach.
Model II causes the rates of fire to change without
considering the densities of fire. It is thought that an
appropriate procedure would be to effect changes, in the
rates of fire, that were based on the amount of fire that
combatants of each force were individually receiving. This





Model II was seen to possess a pitfall because it did
not consider the density of fire. By density of fire I refer
to the number of rounds that each combatant of each side is
receiving. For example, suppose a force of 16 men engages
a force of 12 men and that the initial rates of fire per
man are 8 and 11 rounds per minute, respectively. According
to Model II the 12 man force has the greater volume of fire
(132 rounds to 128 rounds). No consideration is given to
the fact that the average number of rounds received by a
member of the 12 man force in one minute is approximately
10.66 to only 8.25 rounds for the larger force.
As a result of these deficiencies Model II will be
modified to produce a more realistic approach to the
problem. Model III will incorporate the idea of fire
density in an effort to determine which side should be
rewarded with an increased rate of fire and which side
should be penalized with a reduction.
B. MODEL DESCRIPTION
As in the two previous models, equations (5) and (6)
still apply. Similarly, as in Model II, the attrition rate





arise as a result of the modification on Model II. Thus for







B(t) = v (t)Px
x k
where v (t) and v (t) are the rates of fire for Model II.x y
By employing the method used previously, approximations
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As in the previous models v (t) and v (t) are bounded abovetr X y
and below. Equations (17) and (18) thus give consideration
to the densities of fire when altering the rates of fire.
It should be noted that neither of these equations is
defined for X=0 or Y =0 , thus these values must be restric-
ted so taht these situations do not occur. Computation of
data for this study was done by restricting these values
to be equal to or greater than 1.0. Thus the results for
the case when a force level falls below this amount are
slightly biased in theory. However, this approach (i.e.,
that of placing the restriction on X^ and Y ) adds more
realism to the situation being depicted. It should also
be noted that the upper bounds placed on v (t) and v (t)
act in a manner to offset the restrictions placed on XN and




A comparison of Figures 8 and 15 reveals little dif-
ference between Models II and III for this set of parameters
This is due to the fact that in both cases the rates of
fire changed rapidly. Little difference is noted in com-
paring Figures 9 and 16 for the same reason.
The curves depicted in Figure 17 reveal a more interest-
ing case. Here, as a result of the use of Model III we see
that the X force wins when according to Models I and II
this force was defeated. This result is gratifying and
stems directly from the consideration of density of fire.
The results of Figure 18 were to be anticipated due to the
increase in kill probability for the Y force.
Figure 19 does not differ from Figures 5 and 12 since
no changes in rates of fire were allowed. This again
provides a subtle check on the computations. Figure 20
depicts a case where the use of Model III prolongs the
battle by over 6 minutes when compared with either Figure
6 or 13. This result is due to the slower change in the
rate of fire for the Y force. Because of the specific
parameters used, little difference is noted between Figures
14 and 21.
D. COMMENTS
While the use of this approach is deemed superior to
those of Models I and II, it too needs a modification.
This model is sensitive to very small differences between
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the densities of fire and therefore only a small difference
would tend to bias the results in favor of the force
receiving the smaller density of fire. A modification of






As noted, one of the deficiencies of Model III was due
to the fact that small differences between densities of
fire was not considered. Model III also has another
characteristic which although initially appealing could
give problems. This characteristic is that of structuring
the model in a manner such that the changes in rates of
fire are proportional to the difference in densities of
fire. In order to structure a model that is more generally
applicable. Model IV will incorporate the idea of fire
density at follows. The difference between the densities
will again be used to determine any change in rates of fire
but under this model the changes per time unit will be
reflected by C and C and thus not proportional to volume
or density. This procedure is adopted because it is felt
that more realistic changes in rates of fire can be imple-
mented by using C and C as control mechanisms. It should2 3 x y
be clear from analysis of data for Models II and III that
the changes in rates of fire were unrealistic.
Thus Model IV, the final model, will incorporate the
changes discussed. It is realized that this model will
have some deficiencies but it is also believed that this
model will establish a routine, for assessing the effect of




The basic procedure will be to compare the densities of
fire being received by each member of the Y force. The
determination of the force to favor, with an increased rate
of fire, will be made on the basis of the comparison.
The density of fire that is being received by each X







where v (t) is the rate of fire per man, per minute, at
time t, of the Y force and Y(t) and X(t) are the force
levels at time t, of the Y and X forces, respectively.
The density of fire that is beiny received by each Y co:




In each case above X(t) and Y(t) must be closely monitored
to avoid an undefined case.
If we award the force having the smaller D(t) value an
increase in their rate of fire we simply fall in the trap
of Model I. In order to overcome this problem we will
require that the two densities differ by a specified amount
Since it is believed that this specified amount should take
into consideration the magnitude of the densities the
following values will be used.
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The procedure for using the above values is as follows.
First compute D (t) and D (t) and select the scale factor
x y
associated with the larger value. Then, if the ratio of
the larger density to the smaller density is equal to or
less than the selected scale value no significant difference
is said to exist between the densities. If on the other
hand the ratio is larger than the scale factor then the
force having the smaller density is allowed to increase its
rate of fire by some increment as in Model I. By using
this procedure we overcome the problem associated with
volumes which are nearly the same and we also account for
fire density.
As a result of this modification we have
dv /dt = C H [D (t)/D (t)l (19)
and
dv /dt = C H[D (t)/D (t)] (20)
y y y x
where H(6) is determined as follows. For 6 >_ 1
,
H(6) = -1 for 6 > X
for 6 £ X
and for 6 < 1, H(6) = -H(l/6). The X above is the scale
factor associated with the larger density of fire.
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Thus equations (17) and (18) become
VN+ 1 " VN + CXH [DN/D£ ] [AtI < 21 >
and
VN+1 = VN + Cy
H [DN/DN ] [At] (22 >
The notation above is similar to that used previously.
As in the case of Model III, we impose the restrictions
that m v M and m < v < M . Equations (9) and (10)X X X y -"— y ~^ y
with the incorporation of new values for v and v , apply
to Model IV also.
C. ANALYSIS
A comparison of Figures 1 and 22 shows that they depict
exactly the same results. This is because of the fact that
the parameters used in Figure 1 reflected a significant
difference in densities of fire which is the primary point
addressed by Model IV. Thus identical results were produced
The results of Figures 2 and 23 are identical for the same
reason.
Figure 24 gives a result that is most gratifying when
compared with Figures 3, 10, and 17. In particular, this
result shows that Model IV has caused the battle duration
to be extended approximately 10 minutes longer than that
of Figure 17. In addition Figure 24 depicts the X force




Model IV also provides an interesting result in the
case of Figure 25. Figures 4 and 11 show the Y force as
being victorious for this set of parameters and Figure 18
shows the X force as t winner. In Figure 25 the Y force
is again the winning force and the duration of the battle
has been extended.
The results shown in Figure 26 are as anticipated due
to the restrictions on the rates of fire. A comparison of
Figures 26 and 2 7 reveals the impact of reducing the X
force level by 2 combatants.
Figure 2 8 contrary to Figure 7, 14, and 21 shows a
considerable reduction in the average number of survivors
for the Y force. Additionally, the duration of the battle
was extended due to the fact that iniLictlly iio significant
difference existed between the densities of fire.
D. COMMENTS
The most glaring deficiency of Model IV is that for
large differences in densities of fire the changes in rates
of fire are still controlled by C and C . While this is
x y
to be desired for many cases, it is thought that a larger
change could easily be incorporated by employing a second
scale factor which would regulate the changes for different
situations. It should be noted that, for the sets of
parameters used, this does not present a serious problem
because the upper and lower bounds on rates of fire are
relatively close to the initial rates.
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A more sophisticated model can, of course, be construc-
ted but the advantages that it would offer must be weighed
in light of the complications of working with a more
difficult model. Possible extensions and modifications of
Model IV will be discussed later.
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IX. A COMPARISON OF THE MODELS AND THE SQUARE-LAW
A. GENERAL
The most basic assumption in this work is that of choos-
ing the Square-Law as the foundation for model construction.
Because of the importance of this assumption and the large
volume of situations depicted in the study, this chapter
will contain the essential elements of output from each of
the models and the Square-Law. The output, which appears in
the next section, is arranged in a format which will facili-
tate the comparison.
B. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
With the exception of cases 1 and 2 , the Square-Law
results and those of Model IV are strikingly similar. For
these cases , the Square-Law reflects the Y force as winning
and Model IV shows the X force as the winner. The basic
reason for this difference is due to the fact that the
attrition rates for the Square-Lav; were constants while in
model IV they were structured to vary according to rates
of fire. It should be pointed out that for these cases
the results of the Square-Law are identical. This is due
to the fact that the only parameter changed from case 1 to
case 2 was that pertaining to the rate of fire increment,




In all cases the battle durations were longer under the
Square-Law. It may appear that case 5 is an exception to
this; however, case 5 reflects the Square-Law results for
all models as a result of the parameter restrictions. The
average number of survivors is seen to be less with the
Square-Law.
Table I provides a list of input parameters for the
cases considered. Table II provides the essential output
(i.e.; winner, average number of survivors, and battle
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X. FURTHER MODEL REFINEMENTS
A. GENERAL
While the results of Model IV are gratifying, it is
realized that better results can be achieved. The purpose
of this chapter is to present some refinements which may
prove useful in further model development and analysis.
The discussion will address refinements of parameters and
model construction.
B. PARAMETERS
Perhaps one of the most difficult problems in analysis
is that of identifying parameter values which are realistic
for the situation depicted. For this study, the most
unrealistic parameters are probably those that reflect single
shot kill probabilities. These probabilities are geared to
rates of fire and thus together these factors provide the
attrition rates of the forces. However, an early assumption
of this study was that targets are easily identified, thus
no time is lost through efforts of target acquisition. In
reality, target acquisition plays an important role in
combat operations and thus the need exists to include this
aspect of the operation. The time required to acquire a
target can be incorporated in the attrition rates as follows.




where T represents the time required to destroy a target.
Actually, E[T] can be thought of as the sum of target
acquisition time, t , and the time required to kill a
a
target once the target has been acquired, 1/vP. Here v
represents rate of fire and P represents the single shot
kill probability. Thus
E[T] = [1 + vPt J/vP
a
and
B = vP/[l + vPt ]
a




throughout the study. Needless to say, the modified
approach does add realism to the situation being modeled.
The values used for initial rates of fires and rate of
fire increments are very important; yet, they must be chosen
as a result of experience or simply guessed. A survey of




The approach used in model construction was to incorpor-
ate the effect of suppressive fire by making changes, in
rates of fire, which were based on fire density. In actu-
ality, the suppression effect is introduced by the volume
of fire that a combatant experiences and by the miss-distance
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of the rounds. For these reasons it is thought that a model
which reflects miss-distance and volume of fire would be
a valuable asset. Since single shot kill probabilities are
normally defined as the product of a hit probability and
the probability of a kill given a hit, a variable exists
which can be used to structure a model in this manner. In
other words, for a given hit probability and a circular
target radius it is easy to compute the variance of the
rounds for a Circular Normal Distribution by using
P
R
= 1 - exp[-R 2/2a 2 ]
where P„ represents the single shot hit probability, R
rl
denotes the radius of the circular target, and a is the
standard deviation of the distribution. Thus it is possible
to tell on the average the number of rounds that have given
miss-distances. Once this information is obtained it must
be translated to a "threat factor." This factor should
reflect the reactions of an average combatant for the
situation encountered. The reactions should be viewed
from the standpoint that the length of time that a combatant
is suppressed is proportional to the "threat factor." This
is to say, if a combatant receives many close rounds he
will cease fire and take cover longer than if he received
only a few insignificant rounds.
Insight relative to assessing the "threat factor" can
be gained by studying [8] . It is my opinion that the
"threat factor" increases in a manner proportional to an
52

exponential function as the miss-distance decreases below
approximately 5 feet.
Additionally, it is thought that hit probabilities
should increase as a result of achieving suppressive effects
In actuality this could result from firing from more stable
firing positions which were assumed as a result of the
decrease in fire being received. Therefore, this idea
could be incorporated in the model to add more realism.
While the actual incorporation of these ideas in a
model may be very difficult, it is thought that a model
structured along these lines would be very beneficial.
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XI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A model has been developed in this thesis which incor-
prates the effect of suppressive fire in the dynamics of
a fire fight. The final model, Model IV, was developed by
using a phased approach. This approach permitted the
scrutiny of a developed model and therefore proved bene-
ficial in making modifications to the existing model. In
this manner four models were developed.
Throughout the development process, hypothetical combat
situations were analyzed in an effort to discover critical
relationships. For the final model, the most critical
relationship was between the number of rounds being received
by a force and the size of that force. These factors
determine the density of fire being experienced by an average
combatant. Changes in rates of fire are based on these
densities and these changes have a large impact on the out-
come of the conflict.
The basic assumption of this work has been that of using
the Square-Law as the foundation for model development. A
comparison of the results from the Square-Law and those of
Model IV reveals general agreement which is most gratifying.
The present model might be improved in various ways.
Some of these ways have been mentioned in Chapter X. In
particular, it is thought that worthwhile areas for further
study include better definition of attrition rates and the
54

relationship of suppression to miss-distance and volume
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1) For case parameters see page 48-
2) Force levels are expressed in terms of combatants
3) Rates of fire are expressed as the average number
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Figure 3. Model I, Case 3.
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Figure 4. Model I, Case 4.
NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 4 are the same
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Figure 9. Model II, Case 2.
NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 9 are not


















Figure 10. Model II, Case 3.
The rate of fire graphs for Figure 10 are not
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Figure 11. Model II, Case 4.
NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 11 are not
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Figure 12. Model II, Case 5.
NOTE: The rate of ire graphs for Figure 12 are identical
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Figure 18. Model III, Case 4.
NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 18 are not
significantly different than those of Figure 17
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Figure 19. Model III, Case 5.
NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 19 are identical
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Figure 21. Model III, Case 7
NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 21 are not
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Figure 22. Model IV, Case 1.
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Figure 26. Model IV, Case 5.
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NOTE: The rate of fire graphs for Figure 26 are identical
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Figure 27. Model IV, Case 6
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